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I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act' is primarily concerned with maximizing the
public availability of literature, music, and the arts-all for the ulti-
mate benefit of society. To accomplish this goal, an economic incen-
tive is provided on the assumption that individuals will not invest
their talent in creative endeavors without some type of reward.2 This
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The Copyright Act is the legislative response to the
Copyright Clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which provides that Congress shall
have the power "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries."
2. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954): "The economic philosophy be-
hind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the con-
viction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and the useful Arts.'"
The economic assumptions implicit in the American copyright scheme have
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incentive takes the form of a limited monopoly that endows the crea-
tive individual with the exclusive rights to her intellectual property.3
The author's rights are limited,4 however, in order to maximize the
public dissemination of creative works and thereby advance the public
welfare.5 Notwithstanding these limitations, copyright grants to an
author a partial monopoly in the particular manner she has used to
express herself. The tensions between copyright and first amendment
freedoms begin to crystallize when one considers that the first amend-
ment is designed to ensure an unimpeded flow of information to the
public.6 Much attention 7 has focused on whether the copyright law is
been discussed by other commentators. See Perlman & Rhinelander, Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyrigh and The Judicial Process,
1975 Sup. Or. REV. 355; Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright- A Study of Copy-
right in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1970); Breyer, Copyright" A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972); Tyerman,
The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply
to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly.
4. The exclusive rights of 17 U.S.C. § 106 are specifically limited by the provisions of
17 U.S.C. §§ 107 through 118. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
5. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
6. The first amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. The current discussion resulted from two articles published in 1970. Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983 (1970); Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). The debate has continued in the courts and
among the commentators. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100
(1984); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Keep
Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens For Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957
(D.N.H. 1978); Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F. Supp.
875 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949
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in an unconstitutional abridgement of first amendment interests in
free speech.8 Prior to this past Term, the Supreme Court had not di-
rectly addressed the question. 9
In Harper & Row, Publishers v. The Nation Enterprises,'0 the
Court was presented questions concerning the interplay of copyright
and the first amendment: whether the first amendment requires that
the scope of copyright protection for a nonfiction work be narrowed,
and whether the first amendment should prevail over copyright in a
fair use case in which the copyrighted material is politically signifi-
cant." The public interest in the unfettered access to President Ford's
memoirs, it was argued, should outweigh the owner's right to control
the dissemination of his work. The issue of "public interest" as a con-
sideration distinct from traditional fair use inquiry has been ferment-
ing in the lower courts.12 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court
curtailed the vitality of the public interest as a determinative factor in
copyright infringement cases by refusing to acknowledge a "public fig-
ure exception" to the copyright statute. Justice O'Connor noted that
the idea/expression dichotomy and the traditional fair use privilege
are sufficient guardians of first amendment goals and, therefore, the
application of the independent first amendment privilege is not war-
ranted. The court concluded that the appropriation of 300 copyrighted
words from the Ford memoirs did not constitute a fair use and thus
infringed Harper & Row's copyright.
This Article focuses upon the potential tensions that exist between
copyright and the first amendment, and the arguments for a "public
interest" or first amendment exception to the proprietary rights of a
copyright holder. In particular, this Article examines the facts and
holdings in Harper & Row, including the Court's application of the fair
use doctrine and argues that the Court properly rejected the use of the
(1977); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd
in relevant part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior
Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Denicola, Copyright and Free Speeck
Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 283
(1979); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright
Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 790 (1975); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amend-
ment. A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1969).
8. While both the congressional authority to grant copyrights and the first amend-
ment are included in the Constitution, the amendment supersedes any prior in-
consistent material. See 1 M. NmimR, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.10[A], at 1-63
to 1-64 (1985). Thus, any significant interference with first amendment values
should render the copyright law unconstitutional.
9. However, the Supreme Court did accept briefs on the issue in Smith v. California,
375 U.S. 259 (1963).
10. 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
11. Brief for Petitioner at i, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct.
2218 (1985).
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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public interest consideration apart from fair use analysis. Application
of this exception would result in irreparable damage to a copyright
system that has developed a durable and constitutionally satisfactory
internal method of accommodating and enhancing first amendment
values with only a modicum of hindrance to the accessibility of politi-
cally significant information.
II. BACKGROUND
In February 1977, one month after leaving office, Gerald Ford con-
summated an agreement granting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. and
Reader's Digest, Inc. exclusive rights to publish his then unwritten
memoirs.1 3 Ford was provided a writer to assist him in the monumen-
tal task of culling the voluminous record of the post-Watergate White
House era. Distilled from over 6,000 pages of transcribed oral inter-
views and a "mountain of documents,"14 the first draft was completed
nearly two years later.15
As the memoirs were nearing completion in March 1979, Harper &
Row negotiated an exclusive prepublication licensing agreement with
Time, Inc. In return for permission to print excerpts from the manu-
script, Time paid $12,500 in advance and agreed to pay an additional
$12,500 when its edition was complete.1 6 Time retained the right to
renegotiate the second $12,500 payment in the event that any of the
material was published before Time released its article.17
About three weeks before the scheduled release of the Time arti-
cle, an unidentified source secreted an unauthorized draft of the Ford
manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation magazine. The
Nation, published by respondent Nation Enterprises, is the oldest con-
tinuously published weekly magazine in the United States that reports
and comments on politically significant news.s Navasky "neither
solicited nor paid for" the purloined manuscript.19 While immediately
unaware of Time's prepublication rights, Navasky knew that his pos-
session of the Ford manuscript was not authorized. As a result, he
worked frenetically throughout a weekend, examining the memoirs
and selecting material to develop "a real hot news story" before re-
13. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (1985). These
rights included "first serial rights" which are the exclusive rights to license pre-
publication excerpts. I&
14. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 n.1
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
15. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (1985).
16. 1&
17. I&
18. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
19. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1983).
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turning the copy to its source.20 The April 9, 1979 issue of The Nation
contained the article entitled "The Ford Memoirs: Behind the Nixon
Pardon."21 The 2,250 word article was developed from a manuscript of
approximately 200,000 words.2 2 The Nation's piece detailed the ex-
pected publication plans of Ford's book and mentioned Navasky's un-
authorized possession of the memoirs draft. Other than these brief
sidelights, the article consisted entirely of paraphrases, quotations,
and facts "drawn exclusively from the manuscript."23 Navasky pro-
vided no independent commentary.24
When Time editors learned of The Nation article, they sought per-
mission to publish their licensed article a week earlier than was origi-
nally agreed. Harper & Row refused the request pointing to their
"careful program coordinating the Time printing and the book's re-
lease." 25 Time subsequently terminated the prepublication agree-
ment, canceled the publication of its piece, and refused to pay the
remaining $12,500.26 In June 1979, the memoirs, entitled A Time to
Hea" The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford,27 were published. Subse-
quently, both the book and the manuscript were registered for copy-
right. It was undisputed that this work was protected by copyright at
the time The Nation's article appeared in print.28 The controverted
issue at trial was whether The Nation legally appropriated the mate-
rial under the fair use doctrine and whether certain portions of the
material were protectible under the Copyright Act.
The federal district court held for Harper & Row, finding the total-
ity of the historical facts, memoranda, and President Ford's reflections
protected by copyright. The Nation's copying, characterized by
Harper & Row as misappropriation of original expression, was held
20. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (1985).
21. See The Ford Memoirs: Behind the Nixon Pardon, THE NATION, Apr. 9,1979, at
353. The article is reproduced as an appendix to the opinion. Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2235-40 (1985).
22. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2222, 2240 (1985).
23. Id at 2222. The Second Circuit noted that this material from Ford's nonfiction
work consisted primarily of historical facts. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 723 F.2d 195,206-08 (2d Cir. 1983). Much of the information that Navasky
initially believed to have been previously undisclosed had in fact been made pub-
lic through Ford's congressional testimony during the 1974 Hungate Committee
investigation of the Nixon pardon. See Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related
Matters: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 90-151 (1974).
24. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (1985).
25. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1983).
26. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (1985).
27. G. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD (1979).
28. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067,1070 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1982) provides that "works specified by sections 102 and
103, while unpublished, are subject to protection ......
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not a fair use.29 The court concluded that the fair use defense failed
because the publication of the memoir excerpts was not for the use of
"news reporting" and because The Nation's use supplanted Time's use
of the original.30 It was also argued that most of the material used by
The Nation was not protectible by copyright. The court disagreed,
holding that although portions of the manuscript were not copyright-
able, the "totality" was protected by copyright. 31
The Second Circuit reversed, focusing on the issue of whether the
material used by The Nation was copyrightable. 32 The court noted
that by granting rights in expression but not in facts or ideas, a copy-
right "is thus able to protect authors without impeding the public's
access to that information which gives meaning to our society's highly
valued freedom of expression." 33 Since the memoirs chronicled
events of major significance, and the "paraphrasings concern[ed] the
very essence of news and history," first amendment principles require
that only the "barest elements-the ordering and choice of the words
themselves"-be protected.34 The court considered The Nation's use
to be news reporting on a subject of public interest, and was thus a fair
use.
35
The court of appeals also rejected the lower court's holding that
the incorporation of copyrightable expression with uncopyrightable
facts is a "totality" protected by copyright law.36 Judge Kaufman indi-
cated that President Ford's "states of mind" were facts, and were not,
therefore, eligible for protection.37 The Nation "drew on scattered
pieces of information from different pages and different chapters, and
then described that information in its own words,"38 which the court
argued was permissible because historical information cannot be copy-
righted.39 The article also employed quoted, uncopyrightable conver-
sations attributed to persons other than Ford, and other
uncopyrighted governmental sources. 40 Absent the unprotected ele-
ments, the article contained roughly 300 copyrighted words.41 The
court held that this taking of President Ford's expression was fair use
29. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-73 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1072.
32. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983).
33. Id. at 202, (citing 1 M. NIMmER, supra note 8, § 1.10[B][2], at 1-72) (footnote and
some citations omitted).
34. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983).
35. Id- at 207-08.
36. Id. at 204-05.
37. Id
38. Id. at 203.
39. I& at 204.
40. Id at 205.
41. Id. at 206.
1986] COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 637
and accordingly reversed the finding of infringement.42
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that The Nation had in-
fringed Harper & Row's copyright on the Ford memoirs.43 Rejecting
The Nation's argument for a first amendment privilege of access to
these politically significant materials, the Court restricted its analysis
to the fair use privilege. 44 Consequently, the Court found that The
Nation's use was primarily motivated by commercial gain,45 and that
while the memoirs were an historical or autobiographical work, the
fact that they were unpublished tended to negate the defense of fair
use.46 Also, it determined that while the infringing work incorporated
300 copyrightable words from the manuscript, those taken were so vi-
tal to the book as to make the borrowing substantial.47 Finally, the
Court held that The Nation's article damaged the petitioner's poten-
tial market for the prepublication serialization rights in its copy-
righted work, and that actual damages were suffered as a result of the
taking.48 The Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit and
held that The Nation's article was not a fair use of Harper & Row's
copyrighted material.49
III. ANALYSIS
A. Copyright and the First Amendment
1. Generally
Copyright protection extends only to "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."50 Accordingly, pro-
tectible subject matter encompasses "any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."51 An author is "he to
whom anything owes its origin," 52 and originality means that the work
42. Id at 206-08.
43. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2225 (1985).
44. Id. at 2228-31.
45. Id. at 2231-32.
46. Id. at 2232-33.
47. Id. at 2233-34.
48. Id. at 2234-35.
49. Id. at 2235.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The statutory subject matter is not intended to exhaust
the constitutional grant. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664; S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975), reprinted in 13 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REvIsION LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 50 (1977).
51. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954) (statuettes used as lamp bases are protectible by copyright); Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (photograph may be pro-
tectible subject matter).
52. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
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owes its creation to the author.53 An author whose work satisfies
these requirements is entitled to exercise the full panoply of statutory
rights, including the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and
the preparation of derivative works.5 4 Thus the author's fundamental
interest is the right to prohibit the copying of the protected elements
of the work.55
On the other hand, the first amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."5 6 These freedoms establish a basis for the right of the public
both to speak and to receive information,57 in the hope of producing a
politically enlightened citizenry capable of fostering the political and
social values of a democratic society.58 To that end, the first amend-
ment "preserve[s] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail."59 Free debate also provides an outlet for the
expression of opposition to the political and societal status quo, thus
defusing the potentially destabilizing forces of dissent.60 Freedom of
speech and expression are not intended to be restricted solely to the
furthering and protection of political thought and debate. Indeed, the
first amendment embodies a vision for the enlightenment of the indi-
vidual in all facets of life. Justice Brandeis explained: "Those who
won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties ... "61
Maintenance of the public dialogue necessary to foster a market-
place for the exploration of ideas is central to first amendment ideals.
Without unfettered access to information, the dialogue cannot con-
tinue unimpeded. Arguably, copyright stands as an obstacle to the un-
restricted access to information. A governmentally bestowed
monopoly in "writings" theoretically conflicts with a constitutionally
53. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
55. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); Jewelers' Circular Publishing v. Keystone
Publishing, 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 259
U.S. 581 (1922).
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
57. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
58. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
59. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
60. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring); Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 949 (1968) ("Those who
are not permitted to express themselves in words are more likely to seek expres-
sion in violent deeds.").
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
[Vol. 65:631
19861 COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 639
protected system of free and full debate. One court articulated the
problem as follows:
The spirit of the first amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the
extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the
public's right to be informed regarding matters of general interest when any-
one seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed to protect the inter-
est of quite a different nature.6 2
The conflict between copyright and first amendment freedoms is
unique because both strive for the same laudable goal. "While the
first amendment facilitates the flow of information by preventing gov-
ernment intervention, the copyright system encourages the develop-
ment of information and its dissemination by providing incentives for
publication."6 3 The limitations on the monopoly imposed by the copy-
right system minimi ze any perceived conflict by attempting to ensure
the fullest possible dissemination of information. 64
Several significant limitations are imposed on the copyright
owner's rights. First, a copyright will not protect "any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis-
covery."6 5 This statutory limitation on the exclusive rights inherent
in a copyright is a codification of the traditional distinction between
idea and expression.66 This idea/expression dichotomy limits protec-
tion to the particular manner in which the author's ideas are commu-
nicated, relegating the substance of the ideas to the public domain.
According to Justice Brandeis, "the noblest of human productions-
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use."
67
Any obstacle to the use of an author's contribution can inhibit future
creative activity and the general dissemination of information, and
may present a conflict with the first amendment. The idea/expression
dichotomy serves to distinguish those elements of an author's work
that must remain outside the scope of the author's control from those
that may be retained by the author without impeding the public
dialogue.
The final limitations on a copyright owner's rights considered here
are the doctrines of substantial similarity and fair use. In an infringe-
ment suit, the author must demonstrate that her work has been copied
62. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (Lumbard and Hays, JJ., concurring).
63. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 2, at 404.
64. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWs, at 5670.
67. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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and that there is a substantial similarity of copyrightable expression.6 8
The test for measuring "substantiality in terms of copyright infringe-
ment is not how much of the allegedly infringing work was taken
from the copyrighted material but how much of the copyrighted mate-
rial was taken by the infringing work."69 Substantial similarity, there-
fore, permits a user to borrow from the original until the second work
becomes substantially similar to the first.70 The scope of protection
cannot be limited to virtual duplication, "else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations."7 1 Thus, infringement may result from "im-
itation, paraphrasing, or colorable alteration," as well as verbatim
copying.72
Understandably, the courts have found it difficult to articulate a
formula that satisfactorily distinguishes between unprotected ideas
and protected expression. Judge Learned Hand's "abstractions test"
has become the most resilient offering:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is
left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.7 3
Thus, the second author may borrow from the first until she no longer
appropriates simply the ideas, but also the expression of the first. De-
spite the difficulty in defining a workable test, the idea/expression dis-
tinction remains an important device for accommodating
constitutional speech interests. Where an infringing work incorpo-
rates a minimal appropriation of expression, the constitutional stan-
dard is generally satisfied by the substantial similarity test. The fair
use doctrine may protect more extensive appropriations, however, as
it "operates when the objectives of the copyright system would be
frustrated rather than furthered by a finding of infringement." 74
Fair use has been described as a "privilege in others than the
68. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
69. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55, 63 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); see Toksvig v. Bruce
Publishing, 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936); West Publishing v. Lawyers Co-operative Pub-
lishing, 79 F. 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1897).
70. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03, at 13-18.
71. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
72. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 165 (5th ed. 1979).
73. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
74. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Non-
fiction Literary Works, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 516, 524 (1981).
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owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted
to the owner by the copyright."75 The Copyright Act of 1976, repre-
senting the first statutory codification of the doctrine, offers no defini-
tion.7 6 The drafters who contemplated the task arrived at the
conclusion that "no generally applicable definition is possible" because
"each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts."77
The statute offers four considerations for determining whether a par-
ticular use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.7 8 This provision of the copyright
statute is nothing more than a codification of the common law fair use
doctrine. "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doc-
trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." 79
What is clear about the issue of fair use is that "it is not easy to
decide what is and what is not fair use."80 The problem is perhaps
"the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."l In fact, prior
to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios82 the issue of fair
75. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). A former
Register of Copyright offers this definition: "[Fair use] eludes precise definition;
broadly speaking, it means that a reasonable portion of a copyrighted work may
be reproduced without permission when necessary for a legitimate purpose which
is not competitive with the copyright owner's market for his work." HousE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SEss. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, RE-
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 0MNmus COPYRIGHT LAw
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 24 (1977).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
77. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 5679.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The statute closely reflects the factors articulated by Jus-
tice Story in what is considered to be the first American fair use case: "[We must
* * * look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, at 5680.
80. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 53
(1955).
81. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). Justice Story
commented. "This is one of those intricate and embarrassing questions ... in
which it is not... easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down
any general principles applicable to all cases .... [T]he lines . . .sometimes,
become almost evanescent, or melt into each other." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
82. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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use had been presented to the Supreme Court twice and in each of
those cases the lower court opinion was affirmed, without opinion, by
an equally divided Court.83 There is little doubt that "[a] single doc-
trine that has forced the Court to divide equally twice can claim some
measure of difficulty."8 4
Essentially, fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment.8 5 It therefore operates as "one of the most important and well-
established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners"8 6
by balancing the rights of authors and the public interest in access to
information. The fair use privilege applies when the first amendment
values demand access to more than abstract ideas. For instance, when
freedom of speech demands unrestricted access to both the ideas and
the author's particular form of expression, fair use is the flexible prin-
ciple that accommodates that use. Fair use allows much more exten-
sive borrowing of copyrighted material than does the substantial
similarity requirement and it can be utilized as a defense even when
there has been a substantial appropriation of expression.8 7 Fair use
eases inherent tensions between copyright law and the first amend-
ment in that it seeks interests similar to those of the right of free
speech by focusing on the constitutional interest in the flow of infor-
mation. Yet, at the same time, "it seeks to ensure that copyright inter-
ests are not sacrificed needlessly where alternative means of
producing the desired result are available."8 8
2. The First Amendment Exception to Copyright
Recently, courts and commentators have begun discussing the pos-
sibility of a "public interest" or first amendment exception that would
further narrow the copyright monopoly.8 9 This public interest consid-
eration is greatest in those situations involving copyrighted materials
that cannot be reduced to an assortment of facts or ideas because it is
83. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afj'd sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (4-4 decision; Douglas, J., did
not vote); Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), affd,
420 U.S. 376 (1975) (4-4 decision; Blackmun, J., did not vote). A third case was
remanded because of an inadequate record. Public Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover,
284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
84. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 2, at 379.
85. See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05, at 13-62.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, at 5678.
87. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
affd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (4-4 decision; Blackmun, J., did not vote) (photocopying
of entire articles from medical journals held fair use); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (complete copying by video tape recorder
owners is fair use).
88. See Denicola, supra note 7, at 297.
89. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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the author's specific expression that is needed. Only a verbatim copy
of the protected material will suffice to convey accurately the desired
expressive impact. In some circumstances, the fair use doctrine per-
mits this type of use.90
With respect to the origins of the public interest exception, it has
been suggested that the copyright clause of the Constitution9 is a pos-
sible source.9 2 However, this is unlikely since public interest is not
one of the express criteria traditionally used in a fair use inquiry.
93
The copyright clause was intended to benefit ultimately society by
granting authors exclusive rights to their work.94 It can be inferred
from the legislative history of the Copyright Act that the codification
of the traditional fair use doctrine represents the proper balance be-
tween the advancement of the arts and sciences and the congressional
authority to grant exclusive rights to authors.95 Also, because the first
amendment supersedes any inconsistent material within the text of
the Constitution, 96 and a potential for conflict between the first
amendment and the copyright law exists,97 it would be unwise to rest
this exception on the copyright clause.
The first amendment is the most likely source of the public inter-
est exception.98 When the public's right to unimpaired access to infor-
mation is hindered by copyright, the first amendment should protect
the public interest in the dissemination of information. 99 If the role of
the first amendment is to foster the flow of information to the public,
then it could be argued that copyright restricts the flow of informa-
tion, and is therefore antagonistic to the public interest. That reason-
ing would not be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the first amendment.oo
The first amendment should not be read so as to undermine en-
tirely the copyright protection afforded publicly significant materials.
Every copyrighted work can theoretically generate some public inter-
est. However, this interest should not be translated into a license for
the wholesale usurpation of the author's labor. This practice would
eventually erode the economic incentives to create and disseminate
90. See .supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
92. 1 M. NI=IER, supra, note 8, § 1.10[A], at 1-63; Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
93. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5678-80.
96. See supra note 8.
97. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 6.
99. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,311 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
100. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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those copyrightable materials of interest to the public. The right to
receive information would eventually become meaningless as the pub-
lic dialogue would be devoid of any significant contributions.101
In Harper & Row, the Court rejected The Nation's assertion that
"the substantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford
memoirs" excused its unfair use of the manuscript in the creation of
its article.102 Fearing the potential loss of access to sources of signifi-
cant historical information by the public, Justice O'Connor made it
clear that the doctrine of fair use would not be unnecessarily ex-
panded "to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copy-
right."103 To do so would be unnecessary since the Copyright Act
itself provides sufficient safeguards to satisfy first amendment values
through the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.10 4
Such a public interest qualification is unnecessary and potentially
more damaging than profitable to the public welfare.1 05 To acknowl-
edge the proposed privilege in this type of socially meaningful work
would effectively cripple a copyright system that works to contribute
resources to the store of knowledge.106
Because copyright protects only the particular vehicle through
which the author has expressed herself, it does not significantly frus-
trate first amendment values of free speech. Only in rare situations
should the author's specific expression be eligible for wholesale appro-
priation.10 7 The public interest in the dissemination of information is
strengthened by a fundamental limitation on copyright protection.
Copyright does not provide a monopoly over facts or ideas.10s More-
over, the substantial similarity and fair use doctrines are vital safe-
guards to the constitutional interest in the public access to
informational works. Thus copyright operates to prevent only sub-
stantial borrowing of information for use in works that compete di-
rectly or indirectly with the original. In fact, it could be argued,
copyright is the vehicle for the dissemination of that information.1 0 9
As one court stated: "Where the first amendment removes obstacles
101. See Sobel, supra note 7, at 78-79.
102. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (1985).
103. Id. at 2230.
104. See Denicola, supra note 7, at 290.
105. "In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright
Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair
use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use. Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (1985).
106. "Respondent's [public interest privilege] theory . . . would effectively destroy
any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public figure." Id at
2229.
107. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
109. "In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers
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to the free flow of ideas, copyright law adds positive incentives to en-
courage the flow."'1 0
To assure authors of factual narratives, such as the one involved in
Harper & Row, that they may enjoy "the right to market the original
expression contained therein as just compensation for their invest-
ment," the majority properly refused to recognize a special first
amendment exception to the copyright statue.1 Without this special
privilege to excuse its taking of copyrighted material, The Nation's use
was subjected to a traditional fair use analysis.
B. Fair Use
The statutory provision concerning fair use is silent as to the rela-
tive weight to be accorded each of the enunciated factors in the fair
use determination112 Most fair use discussions, therefore, proceed
within the context and format provided in the statute.
1. The Purpose and Character of The Nation's Use
The purpose and character of the use is often limited to a charac-
terization of the infringing work as either a commercial use or one
that is for a nonprofit purpose.113 In this way, fair use is designed to
distinguish between "a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a
work for personal profit."114 And while "any commercial use tends to
cut against a fair use defense,"115 a commercial use does not automati-
cally preclude a finding of fair use.1 6 The infringer's commercial mo-
tive has thus been minimized by some courts.1 17
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression." Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (1985).
110. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 n.14 (11th Cir. 1984).
111. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (1985).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 476 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982). The nonprofit characterization is not limited to educa-
tional purposes.
114. Hearings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1706 (1966) (statement of John
Schulman), reprinted in 7 OMNIBUs COPYRIGHT REvisION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1706 (1976).
115. Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir.
1980). See 3 M. NImmER, supra note 8, § 13.05[A][1], at 13-70 to 13-71.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 50, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, at 5679; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 50, at 62; 3 M. NnImER, supra note
8, § 13.05[A[1], at 13-69 n.24.
117. '"e fact that profit was involved is... legally irrelevant where the work in
which the use appears offers some benefit to the public." Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983). In those cases in which
the "public interest" is considered predominant, the courts have excused the in-
fringer's profit motive and characterized the purpose as fair use. See, e.g., Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (video tape recording
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Despite this trend, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios 118 the Supreme Court noted that "every commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.""19
Where the user stands to profit from the exploitation of the copy-
righted material at the expense of the author, the fair use defense jus-
tifiably should not protect the infringer. 20 However, merely because
the user has a commercial motive does not necessarily decrease the
public benefit derived from the use; neither should it automatically
preclude a finding of fair use.' 21 One court indicated that "whether an
author or publisher has a commercial motive or writes in a popular
style is irrelevant to a determination of whether a particular use of
copyrighted material in a work which offers some benefit to the public
constitutes a fair use."'
22
The public interest in the dissemination of information sometimes
requires a flexible fair use defense that provides broad latitude to sub-
sequent researchers who desire to make their own contributions to the
public dialogue by building on the undertakings of earlier authors.'2
However, when the second author adds little or nothing to the work of
prior authors, the benefit gained by the public is negligible. Courts
have thus closely scrutinized the independent research of the subse-
quent author. 24 In Harper & Row, the public gained little benefit
yields societal benefits by expanding public access to television programs); Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984) (use in television advertisements of ex-
cerpts from Consumer Reports served an "information function").
118. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
119. Id, at 451.
120. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (1985).
121. See, e.g., Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307-09 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
122. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
123. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface,
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977); Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
The Copyright Act includes "news reporting" and "research" among its illus-
trative list of uses that may fall within the scope of the fair use doctrine. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
124. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 976, 980 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett
Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 600-03 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). The
decisions indicate a greater inclination to impose liability where the defendant's
independent research is minimal or non-existent. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec., Inc.
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
1014 (1978); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
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from The Nation's publication of excerpts from the manuscript since
the article copied verbatim or only slightly paraphrased the original
and added no criticism or insight regarding the material copied.
The Court unanimously agreed that the general purpose of The
Nation's use of Ford's memoirs was for the reporting of a news
event.125 However laudable the underlying purpose may have been,
the majority characterized the magazine's actions as exploiting "the
headline value of its infringement, making a 'news event' out of its
unauthorized first publication of a noted figure's copyrighted expres-
sion."1-26 Wholesale usurpation of an author's expression is not defen-
sible under the rubric of fair use when the expression is not closely
wedded to the ideas contained therein, even if it is for the purpose of
reporting news.
With respect to The Nation's argument that it was merely report-
ing news, the Supreme Court responded that the issue was" 'not what
constitutes news, but whether a claim of news reporting is a valid fair
use defense to an infringement of copyrightable expression.' "127 If
the only material taken by The Nation had been "news," there would
have been no infringement since news is not copyrightable.12 8 And
thus if infringement is demonstrated, the courts should not be
"chary" 12 9 of examining whether the material was appropriated for
the reporting of news or for commercial purposes. Indeed, the courts
routinely inquire into the borrower's stated purpose.1 3 0 Thus, the
Court properly held for Harper & Row with respect to the purpose
and character of The Nation's use of the Ford memoirs.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Some works will have greater significance than others for subse-
quent authors who wish to contribute to the public dialogue. It is not
uncommon, then, for the courts to permit a more liberal taking from
rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing, 214 F. Supp.
921 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
125. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (1985); i&! at
2246 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id at 2231.
127. 1i (quoting W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRVILEGE IN COPYRiGHT LAw 119 (1985)).
128. See A. LATmAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY No. 14 (1958), Copy-
right Law Revision Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (Comm. Print 1960), reprinted in
1 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY 30 (1977).
129. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (1985).
130. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (l1th Cir. 1984); Iowa State Univ. Re-
search Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980);
Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
affd, 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
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"work[s] more of diligence than of originality or inventiveness." 1 31
The scope of permissible fair use of primarily informational works
must of necessity be greater "[s]ince the risk of restraining the free
flow of information is more significant with informational work."132
Thus, with historical or autobiographical accounts, the scope of protec-
tion is markedly decreased. The author has exclusive control of her
expression,133 but the factual substance is consistently denied protec-
tion. Subsequent authors are thus able to borrow extensively from
prior historical works, short of bodily appropriating the literal expres-
sion of the writer.134 Biographers, historians, and treatise writers are
permitted this broad latitude because of "the public benefit in encour-
aging the development of historical and biographical works." 3 5
A Time to Heal is a work which recounts and relates facts of mo-
mentus historical significance. The Court characterized it as an "un-
published historical narrative or autobiography" and acknowledged
the compelling necessity for the broad dissemination of factual
works.' 3 6 Nevertheless, the majority was convinced that The Nation
exceeded the use necessary to disseminate the ideas contained in
Ford's manuscript when it "excerpted subjective descriptions and por-
traits of public figures whose power lies in the author's individualized
expression."'137 Simply put, the Court did not consider Ford's expres-
sion so closely wedded to his ideas as to warrant The Nation's exten-
sive quoting and paraphrasing.
Overshadowing this important aspect of the fair use analysis is the
Court's emphasis on the "critical element" of the manuscript's unpub-
lished nature.138 Reasoning that section 106(3) of the Copyright Act
provides the owner exclusive rights to publication and thus the right
to control the first public distribution, the Court concluded that the
right of first publication was unique to the author and that, therefore,
the scope of the fair use defense must be restricted when applied to
unpublished works.139 Thus, while the unpublished nature of a work
131. New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J.
1977).
132. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1049 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
133. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.
1984); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980).
134. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
135. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
136. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (1985).
137. Id
138. Id at 2232-33.
139. Id- at 2227.
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is not determinative, it tends to negate a fair use defense.140
The legislative debate reflects the necessity of maintaining a nar-
row scope of fair use protection for subsequent users where unpub-
lished works are concerned. 141 By anticipating Harper & Row's
deliberate choice of the date and method for publication of the
memoirs, The Nation usurped the copyright owner's exclusive right to
control the distribution of the work. In addition, there were no ex-
traordinary circumstances in Harper & Row that would justify an ex-
ception to the limitation on fair use of unpublished works. While it is
true that the copyright law "was not meant to obstruct the citizens'
access to vital facts and historical observations about our nation's
life,"142 Harper & Row did not involve that type of obstruction. A
Time to Heal, which contained the entire record of facts and historical
observations revealed by Ford, was to be released three weeks after
The Nation's unauthorized article appeared in print. Thus, Harper &
Row exemplifies valid court protection of an author's expression in
accordance with the policies of the copyright law,143 without the sup-
pression of any fact or idea contained in the copyrighted work.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Taking
In the development of its article, The Nation used between 300 and
400 words from the Ford manuscript,144 which amounted to approxi-
mately thirteen percent of the article.145 However, the "expressive
value of the excerpts and their key role in the infringing work" led
the Court in Harper & Row to conclude that The Nation's use was not
fair.146
Fair use is premised on equitable principles of reasonableness.147
Thus substantial copying or paraphrasing of a copyrighted work does
not qualify for protection under the doctrine.148 Courts typically take
a quantitative approach calculating the percentage or the number of
words of the copyrighted work that have been appropriated. More-
over, "the test of substantiality... is not how much of the allegedly
140. Id at 2227-28.
141. S. REP. No. 473, supra note 50, at 65.
142. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983).
143. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
144. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2225 (1985).
145. Id. at 2234.
146. Id.
147. See A. LATmAN, supra note 128, at 5.
148. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); 3 M. Nimun, supra note 8, § 13.05[D][1], at 13-89.
But cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (complete
copying by video tape recorder owners is fair use); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (4-4 decision;
Blackmun, J., did not vote) (photocopying of entire articles from medical journals
held fair use).
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infringing work was taken... but how much of the copyrighted ma-
terial was taken by the infringing work." 49 The question of substanti-
ality, however, cannot rest solely on the simple tabulation of those
copyrighted expressions that have been inserted in the second work.
The quality and significance of the misappropriated expression weighs
heavily in this determination.150 Thus, "[t]aking what is in essence the
heart of the work is considered a taking of a substantial nature, even if
what is actually taken is less than extensive."151
The courts have struggled for some time with the elusive problem
of defining a permissible taking in the area of criticism and review.
Justice Story noted the importance of good faith in these situations:
[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of
fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus
cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticize, but to
supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a
use will be deemed in law a piracy.
1 5 2
Fair use therefore demands that an infringing use not supplant the
work from which it extensively appropriated. In its article, The Na-
tion incorporated some of the most interesting and distinctive passages
from the memoirs. The quantity of the words taken may have been
infinitesimal, but the significance of the appropriated portions to
Ford's revelations was immeasurable.
4. Effect Upon Harper & Row's Potential Market
The harm or potential harm to the plaintiff's market, while the last
of the statutorily enumerated criterion in the fair use inquiry, is con-
sidered by courts15 3 and commentators 5 4 alike to be "the single most
important element of fair use."'155 This concern is maximized where
the infringing work prejudices the original in terms of actual or poten-
tial consumer demand.s6 Copies that do not compete significantly
with the copyrighted work and thus have a minimal impact on the
market for the original are eligible for greater fair use protection than
149. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55,63 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
150. Id.
151. WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enters., 584 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D.D.C. 1984). See also Pacific
& S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1497 n.11 (11th Cir. 1984) ("a small portion of a
work may be especially significant").
152. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
153. See Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th
Cir. 1980).
154. 3 M. NmImER, supra note 8, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-76.
155. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (1985).
156. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1051 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984).
[Vol. 65:631
1986] COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 651
copies that make large inroads on the author's market.
15 7
The copyright owner's exclusive rights operate to protect against
actual market prejudice and to prevent an erosion of the potential
value of the work that the owner may not have already exploited. A
copyright enables its owner not only to directly market her work but
also to adapt her work to other media.15 8 The copyright owner is af-
forded protection even if she has not exercised this adaptation privi-
lege.159 As a result, copyright law does not generally require that a
copy directly compete with the original in order to disrupt its potential
market. An infringement can occur even if the copyrighted work is
adapted into another form, because the copyright owner is entitled to
"any lawful use of his property whereby he may get a profit out of
it .... It is the commercial value of his property that he is protected
for."160 Thus, it has been suggested that making an unauthorized mo-
tion picture from a copyrighted novel would not be a fair use.16 1 A
logical extension of this rationale would prohibit the reproduction of
an author's copyrighted expression of significant historical facts in a
forum other than one of her own choosing.
As the Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios
noted:
Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it neces-
sary to show with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is
a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, the
likelihood may be presumed.
1 6 2
The Nation's borrowing of the verbatim quotes from the unpub-
lished manuscript lent credence and authenticity to its article, but in
so doing it directly competed for a portion of the market for prepubli-
cation excerpts.16 3 Notwithstanding the dissent's argument that it was
The Nation's use of uncopyrightable information which caused Time
to cancel its contract, 6 4 the credibility of the article rested on its ex-
traction of the author's expression. The Court's concern for the "sub-
157. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); 3 M. NImmER, supra note 8, § 13.05[B], at 13-72.
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). "[A] use that supplants any part of the normal market
for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an infringement." S. REP.
No. 473, supra note 50, at 65.
159. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05[B], at 13-79. While the copyright owner is
entitled to the potential profit from her work as well as to any realized profit, it
does not necessarily follow that the owner has suffered no harm when the work
has returned little profit prior to the infringement. Id. at 13-79 n.39.1.
160. King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924).
161. 3 M. NInaR, supra note 8, § 13.05[B], at 13-77 to 13-78. See also Goldstein, supra
note 7, at 1030-31.
162. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
163. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (1985).
164. Id. at 2252-53.
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stantial potential for damage to the marketability of first serialization
rights"165 is not in conflict with the first amendment values since the
expression used was in fact destined for publication. Any nonconsen-
sual interference in the development of a market for intellectual prop-
erty could seriously impede the future creation of these works and in
turn inhibit the harvest of knowledge contemplated by the first
amendment.
Since the predominate purpose of The Nation's use was commer-
cial gain, the likelihood of future harm to Harper & Row could be
presumed. This was, however, a rare case involving "clear cut evi-
dence of actual damage." 166 Time canceled its contract with Harper &
Row and refused to pay the remaining $12,500 as a result of The Na-
tion's article.167 Under these circumstances, the fair use exception
was properly denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court confronted serious questions
concerning the interface of the first amendment and copyright law.
Acknowledging copyright's inherent accommodations of first amend-
ment values primarily through the implementation of the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, the Court refused to
create what it characterized as a "public figure exception" to the ex-
isting copyright scheme. 165 The copyright system is itself an effort to
implement the constitutionally sanctioned aim of encouraging creativ-
ity. This aim would be needlessly undermined by the creation of a
separate first amendment exception since the user can adequately ex-
ercise her right of free speech, and the public can gain access to signifi-
cant works, through a recognition of the copyright owner's proprietary
right to distribute her work in a time and manner that she deems
proper.
This decision reflects the perception that copyright and the first
amendment serve the same laudable purpose-the fullest possible dis-
semination of ideas and information for the ultimate benefit of the
general public. The "harvest of knowledge" contemplated by the first
amendment is furthered by copyright incentives which cultivate "orig-
inal works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest." 169
Since the internal mechanisms of the copyright law fulfill the free
speech goals of the first amendment, it is unnecessary to establish a
significant first amendment privilege to infringement, particularly in
165. I1& at 2235.
166. I& at 2234.
167. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
168. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (1985).
169. I& at 2223.
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those cases where an author's work is destined for public
consumption.
Greg A. Perry, '86

